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ABSTRACT: This paper explores the limitations of empathy for the 
formation of community, particularly within social justice 
education. I begin with a discussion of the major tension within the 
idea of community - that it is founded at once on commonality and 
difference. Building in particular upon the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas, the paper articulates an understanding of community as 
a signifying encounter with difference that is not founded upon 
knowledge about he other, but upon a being-for and feeling-for the 
other. Focusing upon the explicitly educational commitment to
working out forms of relationality conducive to establishing 
community and social justice across social differences, I ask how 
might teaching with ignorance, as opposed to teaching for 
empathy, bring us closer to the being-for others that marks our 
ethical engagement with other people and engenders our 
responsibility othe collective? 
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Both within educational theory and political philosophy, calls for a 
conception of justice that lie beyond a liberal distributive paradigm are 
deeply embedded in appeals to community} Community, as a 
responsible mode of social togetherness, i  seen to be in the service of 
redressing social oppression and civil breakdown between (and amongst) 
members of social groups, be these defined ethnically, racially, sexually, 
or economically. Despite a postmodern understanding within social 
justice education that differences, like identities, are shifting and 
mutable, community nonetheless is located in those moments where a 
coming together across differences i made possible. What it means to 
come together as a time of connectedness and sharing suggests that 
there is some common understanding that supersedes our specific social 
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locations. It is invested with the moral and political possibility that 
gaining common ground is a forerunner to assuming responsibility. 
Community and responsibility would then seem to arise at the moment 
difference ceases to be an impediment to mutual understanding. On this 
view, community brings and unites us together in spite of the radical 
difference between our experiences, and thus bridging the gulf that 
separates each of one us holds promise for treating each other with the 
respect each of us deserve. One of the ways in which social justice 
education has sought o promote such an idea of responsible community 
is through calls for empathy, that is, through feeling with another's 
experience in order to promote a shared understanding that has moral 
and political implications. 
On the surface, empathy as an act of fellow-feeling would appear to 
be constructive toward building unity out of diversity and commonality 
out of difference. 2 It would seem to provide the idea of community with 
the affective glue that binds individuals into a socially cohesive group. 
However, implicit in this idea of community is an illusion of "social 
wholeness" (Young, 1990, p. 232) which risks submerging the very 
differences that social justice education seems so adamant o respect 
into a collective totality where singularity no longer holds any moral or 
political meaning. The idea, then, that singularity might be sacrificed 
at the altar of community seems to miss the point of ensuring that all 
differences, irrespective of understanding, can be responsibly attended 
to. After all, does not each of us have a responsibility to others even 
when understanding their experience is not possible? Responsibility 
conceived as a relation that respects the unique and unknowable 
distinctness of another person (Levinas, 1969, 1998a, 1998b) would 
appear, on the one hand, to reside within the purview of the aims of 
social justice education in respecting experiences that fall outside the 
terms of dominant discourses and social relations, and, on the other 
hand, to exist in direct opposition to the formation of community and the 
commonality it seeks to establish. So the difficulty of thinking about 
community and responsibility together lies in the tension between the 
commonality that is assumed by community, and the attention to 
singularity that responsibility commands. 
One of the urgent demands in seeking social justice is to figure out 
how community may be created and sustained in the face of what, at 
times, appear to be overwhelming odds at getting people to interact and 
communicate across their differences. Part of the task of creating just 
possibilities for living well together is to form alliances to others that 
bridge the gulf between our disparate experiences in ways that 
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recognize that we cannot have f irsthand knowledge of another's life. 
How can people interact with one another across their myriad 
differences to form a common ground and at the same time have those 
differences respected? Is empathy the answer? 
Such questions, I argue, become particu]arly acute within social 
justice education, given that empathy is thought o embody both moral 
force and political possibility (el. Boler, 1999). Unlike other emotions, 
empathy is not simply considered to be one affective response among 
many, but it is seen to have ethical egitimation in a way that other 
emotions, such as pity and guilt, do not usually enjoy. In fact, viewed as 
an explicitly moral emotion, empathy is the very form of attachment 
seen to be necessary for living responsibly together. It is this emphasis 
on what empathy appears to offer to our sense of togetherness that has 
made it so prevalent, in my view, within social justice education. The 
idea is that the more we feel with an other, the better we are able to 
have a sense of what matters to her or him and, consequently, come to 
be with the person better. The ultimate hope is that our capacity for 
empathy may contribute to a mode of being with others that furthers 
the moral and political project of justice. 
However, what I pursue in the present paper are three points that 
disrupt the privileging of empathy as an answer to establishing a 
responsible mode of social togetherness. First, I explore how moments 
of social togetherness also might sig~aify something other than 
commonality and conventional notions of community. Following 
Levinas, I expose the tensions between the common and the unique that 
such moments invoke and what those tensions have to offer our 
understanding of teaching for social justice. Thus, one of the guiding 
questions of this paper is to what degree can community function as a 
signifying relation with difference that takes into account he very 
difference that gives rise to the promise of community in the first place? 
Second, Zygmunt Bauman's (1995) understanding of different 
modalities of togetherness, particularly the distinctions he makes 
between being-with and being-for others, offers us a point of departure 
for considering the limits of empathy as an answer to the ethical 
problem of social togetherness. That is, coupled with Levinas' 
understanding of responsibility as a being-for the unique other, I 
emphasize here that it is not knowledge about the other through 
empathy that is important for community, and for social justice 
education more specifically, but the orientation to the other's 
unknowability as a learning from the other. A second question, then, is 
how might we conceive of social togetherness othat responsibility for 
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the other's singularity is not collapsed into a uniform notion of 
community? Third, in focussing upon the explicitly educational 
commitment o working out forms of relationality conducive to 
establishing community and social justice across ocial differences, I ask 
how might teaching with ignorance, as opposed to teaching for empathy, 
bring us closer to the being-for others that marks our ethical 
engagement with other people and engenders our responsibility to the 
collective? 
Community and the Pedagogical Question 
I have posed above a central tension in promoting an idea of community: 
it wishes to respect dl f ference- ethically and responsibly-  and yet risks 
subsuming difference under the sign of commonality. Critchley (1999) 
notes in his commentary on Levinas that "community has a double 
structure" (p. 227); it both relies upon the radical distinction between 
self and other that makes an ethical relationship ossible and upon an 
obliteration of that distinction in creating a unity between subjects. But 
how does this come about? Is it possible to simply rethink the terms of 
community differently, so that it no longer comes to mean commonality 
at all? If  we turn to Levinas, we see that the political structure of 
community inherently rests upon the ethical structure of the self-other 
relation. What both Levinas (1969), and to a certain degree Derrida 
(1997), suggest, as wc will see below, is that the project ofjustice must 
not lie in a new definition of community, but in a radical appreciation 
of how community emerges - and what is lost and gained in the process. 
Thus, community here is cast not so much as a political or social entity 
having fixed properties, but as a moment of signification through which 
subjects enact a form of social togetherness. 
Central to conmmnity, and the equality and commonality it implies, 
is an understanding that our relations do not exist as though divorced 
from social context. Indeed, Levinas conceives of the ethical relation 
between self and other as already situated within community, signalled 
by what he refers to as the "third party:" 
The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other - language is 
justice. It is not that there first would be the face, and then the 
being it manifests or expresses would concern himself with justice; 
the epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity. The face in its 
nakedness as a face presents to me the destitution of the poor one 
and the stranger; but this poverty and exile which appeal to my 
powers, address me, do not deliver themselves over these powers 
as givens, remain the expression of the face. The poor one, the 
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stranger, presents himself as an equal. His equality within this 
essential poverty consists in referring to the third party, thus 
present at the encounter, whom in the midst of his destitution the 
Other already serves. He comes to join me. (1969, p. 213) 
What Levinas proposes here is that two simultaneous relationships are 
made possible in an encounter with the other. The dyadic ethical 
relation between self and other, or I and stranger, constitutes the basis 
for what Levinas will later rcfcr to as responsibility at the same time 
that the face of the other signifies to the I "the whole of humanity" 
(1969, p. 213). Levinas does not see these relations as lying in sequence; 
rather they present he double consequence ofsignification: that is, the 
face signifies destituteness and therefore commands from the self a 
response that is truly ethical while also signifying, through the third 
party, all others within humanity. When the other joins me, she joins 
me in community and is with me in serving the third party. Together, 
in community, justice is made possible. 
Both the ethical relation and the political relation, then, appear as 
processes of signification. What is highlighted here is that the co- 
presence of subjects, the co-incidence of self and other (and the third), 
can only emerge from a signifying encounter with difference. There is no 
co-existence in togetherness possible without he disparity of difference, 
without there being a recognition that the other is not-me. For Levinas, 
"human community [is] instituted by language, where the interlocutors 
remain absolutely separated" (1969, pp. 213-214). Thus, what Levinas 
insists on is an understanding ofcommunity that is both coincident and 
non-coincident, or as Critchley (1999) puts it, "community is the 
coincidence of coincidence and non-coincidence, what Levinas calls, in 
a rather uncomplicated manner, 'human fraternity'" (p. 227). The 
signification ecessary for establishing this community with a double 
structure (i.e., the other's thce signifying its own separateness, alterity, 
and destituteness a  we l l  as  the third and the whole of humanity) also 
accomplishes the possibility for justice and ethics by putting the self into 
question (Levinas, 1969, p. 213). a This questioning does not arise out of 
what others have to say (e.g., they do not necessarily literally question 
me), but in the fact that they are others, absolutely different from 
myself. My encountering others challenges me and compels me to ask, 
"who am I?" in relation to them. Thus who 'T' am must continually be 
(re)defined against his radical alterity through my response. And such 
a response, for Levinas, is nothing short of welcoming the other in this 
moment of encounter: 
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Equality is founded in this welcoming of the face, which is already 
my responsibility in his regard, and where accordingly he 
approaches me from a dimension of height and dominates me. 
Equality is produced where the other commands the same and 
reveals himself to the same in responsibility; otherwise it is but an 
abstract idea and a word. It cannot be detached from the 
welcoming of the face, of which it is a moment. (1969, p. 214) 
Equality, then, is only possible because the other's alterity demands a
response from me. Meeting the other as equal is an unsettl ing and 
provocative xperience where the 'T' cannot remain aloof from the 
community in which the person finds oneself. That is, the self is caught 
in an unavoidable response to the other (and to all the other signifies) 
in a way that implicates the person in the co-existence she or he shares 
with others and to the possibilities it opens up for the future - to the 
limitless possibilities of justice. In his commentary on Nietzsche's call 
for a community with future philosophers, Derrida writes of the 
extraordinary demand that community makes on us: 
A double responsibility which doubles up again endlessly: I must 
answer for myself or before myself by answering for us and before 
us. I/we must answer for the present we ibr and before the we of 
the future, while presently addressing myself to you and inviting 
you to join up with this 'us' of which you arc already but not yet a 
member. (1997, p. 37) 
With such demands structuring the advent of community - the 
responsibility to invite and welcome others as members into the fold of 
fraternity or human collectivity, where everyone is equal and shares a 
common pursuit of justice - is coterminous with the virtual 
disappearance of disparity and separateness in laying claim to 
community. How do we answer the other(s) in order to promote 
conditions for future coexistence in ways that address the particularity 
of the you? The emphases, both for Levinas (1969, 1998a) and Derrida 
(1997), on the importance of welcoming and address, suggest that 
community isa continuously on-going practice that negotiates a difficult 
ethical path. In these views, community is not a consequence of an 
encounter with others, but a practice of encountering others. 
Commonality, equality, and shared responsibility can only ever be 
derived from the presence of difference within community, a difference 
that constantly threatens to break in upon and dissolve the communal 
bond. Yet, equally paradoxically, it is precisely in attending to this 
difference, to others as others, that enables formations of community, 
formations that take seriously the burden of justice, that is, the burden 
of making decisions, evaluations, comparisons, and judgements. This 
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view of community is hence incomplete, dependent as it is on the 
changing quality of relationality and interaction that shapes social 
togetherness and stands in contrast to conventional notions of 
community. Conventionally speaking, requiring that some commonality 
be established with those who are different from me or us means that 
the goal of our interactions operates within a logic that cannot fully 
recognize difference as necessary to the formation of a responsible 
community. That is, even when difference is a point of departure for 
communicating with someone, difference itself is not a def in ing  feature 
of either community or responsibility. Community on this account is 
understood as an object or entity that one negotiates one's attachment 
to - as though it pre-exists the very subjects that participate in it. But, 
by virtue of its signifying function, I want to suggest that community as 
a communicative process has an eminently pedagogical nature that 
perhaps goes a long way to explain why empathy appears o appealing 
to its formation. 
There is an implicit teaching and learning that must transpire in 
the communicative encounter for there to be community at all. Without 
this pedagogical force, community would be reduced to a contrivance 
rather than effectuating the alteration of self and society that it in fact 
demands. What I mean by this is that unity cannot be established by 
fiat, and as soon as any alteration is established, a new unity must be 
forged. Such alteration, if we are to follow Derrida and Levinas on this 
point, comes about because the self is called into question through an 
encounter with the other and must assume responsibility for that other. 
The particular obstacles that face people in coming together to speak 
and listen to each other lie precisely in our difficulties to be questioned, 
in our resistances to change, and in our uncertainties about how to 
respond. It is what makes forming communities out of infinite 
differences so difficult in the first place. As Lingis puts it: 
To question someone is not simply to make oneself a receptor for 
information that one will soon reissue; it is to appeal to another for 
what is not available to oneself .... To address omeone is not 
simply to address a source of information; it is to address one who 
will answer and answer for his or her answer. (1994, p. 87) 
Community is so difficult to create and sustain precisely because the 
self is at stake in communicating with others. The very point of 
community for projects of social justice is that it presents us with the 
hope of transformation at both the level of the self and the society, and 
through this transformation we edge ourselves closer to peace and 
justice. It assumes, therefore, that the ways we communicate and 
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establish forms of social togetherness involve learning from others and 
attending to our implications in that learning. But if community is an 
arduous process of being with others that depends equally on our 
capacity to learn from others and on our capacity to welcome and 
respond to others, then how might we think about he role of empathy? 
For if empathy is a feeling with others that bridges differences, to what 
degree does empathy embody a signifying relation to difference that 
evokes learning, welcoming, and responding? 
Responsible Togetherness: 
From Being Aside to Being With to Being-for 
We exist together in many different ways according to social contexts. 
For instance, we are together differently in a classroom than we are at 
a political protest, or when we rally around signifiers of race and gender, 
or are simply walking on a crowded street in our neighbourhood. Each 
of these forms of togetherness involves certain patterns of interaction 
that shape what it is we expect from them. Bauman (1995) claims that 
while the interaction is different, forms of togetherness are enacted 
through three modalities of being, what he refers to as being-aside, 
being-with, and being-for. Each of these reveals what is at stake for the 
self in encountering the other. His understanding of how we are 
together, then, offers a way of thinking about what modes of 
togetherness are worthy of pursuit in promoting social justice in 
education. It also allows us to consider what degree empathy plays a 
role in establishing responsible community. 
First, forms of togetherness are the settings in which people are 
initially "cast aside each other" (Bauman, 1995, p. 50). That is, people 
inhabit a shared space, yet are not at the centre of it; they have the 
modality of being-aside. 4 Being together in this sense means that we 
exist tangentially, each one of us occupies pace, but we do not interact 
in any significant way. 
However, there is also possibility for interaction while we are 
together. As soon as one enters an encounter with another, one ~moves 
into the modality of being-with," the second modality identified by 
Bauman (1995, p. 50). Being-with signals that one has relevance for 
another, but this, Bauman claims, is topical and transient. Being-with 
is a mode of communication that is constrained by the parameters of 
time and place whereby people may have interesting interactions, but 
are not transformed in any way by them. As a consequence, aspects of 
the self are engaged in ways that are normative and safe. As Bauman 
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states, such encounters are conventional: "Conventions ubstitute 
concern with the rule for the concern for the partner of encounter .... 
The rule-governed togetherness, the being-with exhausted in the 
observance of rules, is a colony of hermits, an archipelago f one- 
resident islands" (p. 56). As such, being-with depicts a mode of 
interaction that is rooted in knowledge, understanding, and 
communicative transparency. Community, insofar as it holds potential 
for transformation, does not obviously rest here. 
For Bauman, there are moments, however, when people actually 
break through convention and transcend the limitations of t ime and 
place. He writes of the third modality of togetherness: 
Such another way of relating is being-for .... Being-for is a leap 
from isolation to unity; yet not towards a fusion, that mystics' 
dream of shedding the burden of identity, but to an alloy whose 
precious qualities depend fully on the preservation of its 
ingredients' alterity and identity. Being-for is entered for the sake 
of safeguarding and defending the uniqueness of the Other; and 
that guardianship undertaken by the self as its task and 
responsibility makes the self truly unique, in the sense of being 
irreplaceable; no matter how numerous the defenders of the 
Other's unique otherness may be, the self is not absolved of 
responsibility. Bearing such a task without relief is what makes a 
unique self out of a cipher. Being-for is the act of transcendence of 
being-with. (1995, pp. 51-52) 
In other words, an encounter with the Other erupts through the space 
of convention without intent or telos. The being-for the Other is a 
togetherness born out of the immediacy of interaction, a communicative 
gesture that does not have as its end anything except its own 
communicativeness, it  own response. And it is in this moment of 
transcendence that convention has no meaning, has no currency within 
the bounds of the relationship. Moreover, for Bauman, the being-for 
invokes commitment: 
Eyes stop wandering around and glossing over moving shapes, eyes 
meet other eyes and stay fixed - and a commitment shoots up, 
apparently from nowhere, certainly not from previous intention, 
instruction, norm; the emergence of commitment is as much 
surprising as its presence is commanding. (1995, p. 53) 
The commitment B auman writes of here is one born out of the exigency 
of the face-to-face encounter with the Other. It is a commitment that 
inevitably arises in an open and direct communication; and it is a 
commitment one avoids, for instance, when one averts one's eyes away 
from someone, like when a teacher asks a question to the class only to 
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find all students' eyes darting to the floor. But what is most remarkable 
is how being-for ushers in a responsible subjectivity that is not located 
in what one knows about someone, but in a communicative approach to 
someone rooted in one's capacity to feel. 
Levinas (1998a) understands an encounter with the Other as 
constituting a modality not simply of being-for, but of being responsible 
for the other. This "for" is, as John Llewelyn (1995, p. 145) notes, always 
rooted in sensibility, in the quality of relationality that lies outside 
language, outside knowledge. "Knowing, identification which 
understands orclaims this as that, understanding, then does not remain 
the pure passivity of the sensible" (Levinas, 1998a, p. 16). Thus, the 
ethical encounter is that which transcends being-with while remaining 
firmly grounded in feeling and sensation. 
There are two distinguishable characteristics of the being-for that 
are helpful to this discussion. First is that the encounter with the Other 
is a relation with the unknowable mystery of the other person. 
If the relationship with the other involves more than relationships 
with mystery, it is because one has accosted the other in everyday 
life where the solitude and fundamental alterity of the other are 
already veiled by decency. One is for the other what the other is for 
oneself; there is no exceptional place for the subject. The other is 
known through sympathy, as another (my)self, as the alter ego. 
(Levinas, 1998a, p. 83) 
What Levinas articulates here is that while we can have a shared 
reality with the Other, feelings such as sympathy (and, I suggest, 
empathy) require renouncing the irreducibility of self and other through 
their seeking out knowledge about the other. This means, then, that in 
everyday communication within social situations uch as teaching and 
learningwe of course do empathize, commiserate, sympathize, and pity, 
and these emotional events can connect us in profound ways. For 
Levinas (1969), it is not that these everyday feelings are unimportant, 
it is just that they have little to do with the necessary maintenance of 
alterity, an alterity that is revealed in the "straightforward" encounter 
with the face (p. 203). 5 Thus, feeling with others cannot lead to 
transcendence, for it blurs the distinction between self and other. As any 
feeling-with does, empathy might bridge the divide of difference through 
understanding and knowledge, but it does so at the cost of respecting 
the Other's fundamental difference. In this way, empathy forecloses the 
double structure of community, for it lands squarely on the side of 
commonality (i.e., through shared understanding) and makes impossible 
the survival of singularity that difference signifies. 
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Second, the encounter with the Other requires the self to depose its 
ego, its intentionality and consciousness, in the service of the Other, as 
it feels and senses its way to a response to the other. Responsibility for 
the Other, being-for the other, means that the self is no longer a self- 
regulating agent, but is passively open and exposed. Although we may 
respond to what someone is saying, although we may feel with the 
Other in her or his articulated pain or pleasure, the ethical relation lies 
in attending to the approach of the Other in such a way as to limit one's 
own self concern. The self feels for the Other in such a way as to disrupt 
its own pleasures, its own ego enjoyments. "It is the passivity of being- 
for-another, which is possible only in the form of giving the very bread 
I eat. But for this one has to first enjoy one's bread" (Levinas, 1998a, p. 
72). Counter to our more commonplace understandings, responsibility 
is neither ego-directed nor consciously chosen. 6 When I feel-for the 
Other, I am in a state of exposure, a nakedness Levinas would say, that 
makes me susceptible to the Other's needs. Thus, my feeling-for is a dis- 
interested, non-ego-invested feeling that emanates only through the 
encounter with the Other, as opposed to being generated from within 
the subject. It is the supreme example of "being moved," "being 
touched," and "being affected." That is, being becomes inextricably 
bound to feeling through a passive encounter with difference. In this 
sense, aresponsible community would entail a mode of feeling that does 
not seek to end our differences, but one that has generative potential to 
sustain open modes of relationality across differences. Understanding 
and knowledge, while essential for making judgements, comparisons, 
and priorities can only emerge, for Levinas, out of an openness through 
which the self is capable of transformation. 
It is precisely because it is assumed that empathy has the power to 
disrupt conventional ways of being together and transform our 
understandings of self and other that it is seen to be such an important 
focus for social justice education. Yet, commitment and responsibility, 
as Levinas (1998) and Bauman (1995) suggest, erupt through forms of 
communication that are not pre-designed. Our very encounter with 
difference poses as a surprise that cannot be known beforehand. 
Likewise our responses to others cannot be made from easy recipes, as 
if those responses could be delineated prior to our meeting other 
persons. Thus, it is non-knowledge and our orientation to learn from 
others in the moment of encounter that characterize the double 
structure of community. The non-intentional quality of feeling that 
nourishes the possibility of community turns any demand for empathy 
into an impossibility. That is, how can teaching for social justice ask 
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students to empathize as a condition of creating deep communal bonds, 
when not only is no feeling within anyone's phere of control, but when 
the very conditions of community and responsibility both imply that 
feelings cannot be demanded, but must be given. 
In terms of the actual feelings of empathy (and not just the 
pedagogical demand for them), what remains important o consider is 
how empathy, through its impulse to overcome difference and partake 
in a shared reality, focuses upon what we can know of the other's 
experience. To suggest that students or teachers ought to "put 
themselves in the other's shoes" seems to be encouraging a shutting 
down of the very opportunities for communicative openness and 
learning from the other that social justice education works so hard to 
achieve, and that responsibility community would appear to require. It 
is not that we should not empathize. This seems to me as equally an 
impossible request as is the demand for empathy. The fact is, we do 
empathize regularly with others' suffering, enjoyment, and perspectives. 
My point is that empathy cannot but mask, despite our best intentions, 
the other's radically different feelings, experiences, and needs. Empathy 
necessarily leads to questionable assumptions about how the other is 
ultimately somewhat like you, and that what you feel is the same as the 
other's feelings. 
But if teaching empathy is not the answer to encouraging forms of 
responsible community that can respect difference, then what can be the 
alternative? How might we rethink teaching itself as a being-for; that 
is, as a practice that does not merely demand students to be for others, 
but that sees itself as a mode of togetherness that displays the openness 
requisite to living responsibly across difference? 
Teaching with Ignorance, or 
Teaching as a Response to a Question 
Proposing that ignorance can occupy a necessary place in teaching, and 
a necessary place in the modality of being-for that characterizes 
responsible togetherness, verges on the absurd. Is not the problem for 
building community about not having enough knowledge about social, 
cultural, ethnic, racial, sexual, and religious differences? Does not 
empathy, insofar as it is a feeling through which the self comes to share 
in the experience with another, precisely offer this knowledge? 
Becoming teachers frequently say to me that empathy is what gives 
them the understanding ofdiverse communities that are represented in
their classes. It gives them access to others' lives in ways that make 
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them feel connected to their students. It allows them to get to know 
their students better. However, I suggest to them that knowledge alone 
cannot solve the issue of living well and responsibly together. Not only 
is it for the other to say whether or not he or she has felt understood, 
but even more importantly, our knowledge at best cannot capture the 
full range and complexity of another's life. Nor can the multiple layers 
of what it means for students to belong to communities be contained 
within a teacher's understanding. The sheer plurality of communities, 
and the shifting nature of their formation make any appeals to 
knowledge qually absurd. The impossibility of knowledge and the 
certainty that it ostensibly brings does not relieve us, however, of our 
responsibility to our students and for creating communities across 
difference. On the contrary, the whole possibility of responsibility is put 
into sharp relief against of this very impossibility. Following through on 
the idea of that being-for the other entails feelings that contribute to the 
formation of both responsibility and community, the point becomes to 
consider teaching as an approach that cannot know beforehand what it 
is seeking. 
As we have seen, the encounter with difference that produces 
community is an eminently pedagogical one. Similarly, the community 
that social justice education aims to forge is also pedagogical, though 
not in the sense that teachers have to encourage students to feel 
empathy or have to themselves empathize with their students. Rather, 
where the pedagogical insistence lies is in terms of how the other calls 
me into question, requiring me to listen and learn from her in order to 
respond responsibly. Teaching with ignorance requires a suspension of 
presuming to know. It means that community lies not in some 
predefined feeling, but in our responses to students that are conditioned 
upon our capacity to be moved by the singularity of the other's 
experience. It is f~om a place of non-knowledge, then, where my 
responsibility becomes heightened. If I am exposed in a gesture of 
communicative openness to the Other, where I can feel-for the other, I
can listen, attend, and be surprised. It is only in this way that the Other 
can affect me, move me, touch me. Out of this state of ignorance, where 
I am not laying claim to another's experience, the being-for initiates a 
togetherness that disrupts the very transparency of communication a d 
the conventional modes of togetherness we find ourselves in, and in this 
it becomes truly radical. 
Classrooms are sites of signification where the ongoing formation of 
community is continually at work. The double-bind of community 
combined with the ethical imperative to be-for the other means that 
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education lives through these tensions, moving between and through 
forms of social togetherness that cannot be fixed with appeals to 
empathy. I have proposed here that teaching as a response to a 
question, a response that can only be rooted in a moment of 
unknowability, contributes to understanding teaching as itselfa moral 
and political practice. Highlighting community as a signii~ng practice 
which, on the one hand, allows for the dissolution of convention and 
accepted communal bonds (when, for instance, the being-for interrupts 
commonplace forms of togetherness) and, on the other hand, establishes 
commonality and shared understandings in community (when, for 
instance, the singularity of the face signifies that the self is responsible 
for many others and not just a singular Other), means coming to grips 
with our own implications in those relationships. Teaching for empathy, 
as it can only ever seek to suture over differences, fails to engage with 
the problem - and the urgency - of how responsibility is not just a 
matter of establishing commonality, but about a pursuit os that 
requires working through the aporia posed by community and the 
difference which both makes it possible and impossible simultaneously. 
Thus teaching with ignorance is not the answer, as if we can teach 
this way all of the time. Instead, I see it as a way of thinking through 
some tensions for creating and sustaining forms of social togetherness 
that respect difference. Teaching witb ignorance means responding to 
the commitment I have for the other, a commitment that makes possible 
forms of community that are not rooted in the content of what is said, 
but in the approach to the mystery of the other. It allows for 
attentiveness to singularity and specificity within the plurality that is 
our social ife. It is only when we recognize and embrace our ignorance 
that we can truly begin to learn from the stories that others have to tell. 
The question of what attaches us and holds us together, and what this 
means for more just relations in the present and future, cannot 
therefore be answered with an appeal to empathize with others better. 
Rather, what I am suggesting is that just forms of togetherness lie in 
the eminently disruptive time of the communicative approach itself and 
the feeling-for that this demands. 
NOTES 
1. Community can, of course, be defined in many different ways, and some 
authors eschew its value altogether. I is Marion Young (1990), for instance, 
in putting forth a notion of social justice that puts domination and 
oppression ... develops a notion of "city life" as a model for social 
togetherness that moves explicitly away from the emphasis on community 
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(pp. 226-256), which she sees as having an il lusory desire for social 
wholeness. Yet, its rather  ubiquitous presence in social justice education 
suggests to me that it needs serious unpacking precisely with respect o its 
dream of commonality. Thus, rather  than mobilize new metaphors,  I 
investigate here the possibility and l imitations of community as an 
expression of. 
2. See my discussion of the different ways empathy has been defined and 
its relation to ethical possibility in Todd (2003). 
3. As Robert Gibbs (2000) puts it, "We begin with questions. Not the 
questions I ask, but the question I am asked. When we listen, we hear  the 
questioning that  comes from the other person. I need to l isten to be 
questioned in a way I cannot question myse l f -  and in l istening to the 
question I am shown the questioner. In the question the other appears as 
a teacher who questions me in ways I cannot anticipate" (p. 32). 
4. This is how Levinas characterizes Heidegger's being-with. Viewing it as 
a kind of being-aside, Levinas sees that this form of togetherness cannot 
lead to the emergence of responsibil ity and remains caught up in an 
individual's olitude. 
5. The full quote reads: "No fear, no trembling could alter the 
straightforwardness of this relationship, which preserves the discontinuity 
of relationship, resists fusion, and where the response does not evade the 
question" (Levinas, 1969, p. 203). 
6. This is not, of course, to say that  the decisions we make regarding our 
t reatment  of others is without any significance. I t  is merely to say that  the 
(metaphysical) preconditions for such decisions to be made lie in the 
sentient, not conscious, subject. 
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